By Dr. Ahmed Adnan al-Mayali
September 30, 2026 marked a turning point in Iraq’s security and political trajectory, as the Iraqi and U.S. sides officially announced the completion of the withdrawal of American forces and troops belonging to the international coalition from Erbil Air Base, the last point of foreign military presence in the country, bringing to an end a mission that had lasted nearly twelve years.
Yet the completion of that process was not accompanied by the second measure that had been expected to coincide with it: placing the weapons of armed factions exclusively under state control. Instead, the Iraqi government extended the deadline granted to the factions until June 30, 2027, indicating that the disarmament process has effectively shifted into a deferred process of regulating armed groups.
First: Structural Pressures Driving a Settlement on Disarmament
The latest regional war forced Iraq to confront difficult questions about its political future, the role of armed factions, and the limits of Iranian influence that has continued for more than two decades.
The war was preceded by long-term developments, most of them rooted in the abnormal circumstances under which Iraqi state institutions were formed following the U.S. occupation in 2003, and later in their inability to withstand the structural collapse represented by the rise of ISIS and its seizure of Iraqi cities.
This coincided with Iraq’s growing integration into Iran’s regional axis, including attempts to reproduce elements of the Iranian model by establishing security, political and economic structures parallel to official state institutions and gradually assuming some of their traditional functions — a pattern described in political sociology as a “parallel state” or a duality of decision-making centers.
Three levels of variables can be identified as contributing to the emergence of pressure, both inside and outside Iraq, on the current government to confront weapons existing beyond state authority.
1. Structural Economic Pressure
Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz resulted in a sharp decline in Iraqi oil exports, exposing an unprecedented level of economic vulnerability that threatens the state’s ability to meet its basic obligations.
The expansion of the U.S. sanctions regime also compounded the damage facing the Iranian economy, which has increasingly relied on sanctions-evasion networks operating through the Iraqi environment.
At the same time, the expansionary investment-spending policies adopted by the government of Mohammed Shia al-Sudani between 2022 and 2026 left Iraq with debts exceeding 100 trillion Iraqi dinars, while the Central Bank’s reserves declined to $85 billion.
2. Shifts in the Regional Balance of Power
Repeated attacks on Gulf states and Jordan launched from Iraqi territory transformed the issue of armed factions from a domestic crisis into a threat affecting the structure of regional deterrence itself.
The use of Iraqi territory as a platform for attacks on Arab states raised new questions about Iraq’s relationship with the wider Arab regional order and led to U.S.-Saudi strikes against Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) positions, illustrating the limits of the compromised sovereignty from which Iraq has increasingly suffered.
3. Internal Fragmentation and the Challenge of Crisis Management
Domestic indicators reflected a growing possibility of clashes among armed forces themselves despite public statements emphasizing containment, alongside rising political tensions that could revive popular unrest similar to the October 2019 protests and intensify calls for federal repositioning.
The Coordination Framework’s lack of confidence in its ability to manage the crisis contributed to the formation of a government assuming the role of mediator between the Iranian actor on one side and U.S. and regional pressures on the other.
Second: Foreign Troop Withdrawal in Exchange for Delayed Disarmament
The first half of the reciprocal equation was completed: the withdrawal of U.S. and other foreign forces. The parallel component, however — disarming the factions — was postponed.
After September 30, the Iraqi government announced the complete withdrawal of foreign forces from Iraq, while a Pentagon spokesperson declared the formal conclusion of Operation Inherent Resolve following the departure of the final troops and military equipment from Erbil Air Base.
Relations with coalition countries are now expected to transition into bilateral security arrangements.
The Iraqi government suspended the work of official institutions from September 30 until the following Sunday to mark “Sovereignty Day,” in a move observers viewed as carrying a dual symbolic deterrent message.
The first was directed toward armed factions: that the justification for maintaining their weapons in order to “resist the occupation” had effectively disappeared.
The second was directed toward Iran: that restoring the state’s monopoly over the instruments of force had become an overdue requirement.
The second part of the equation, however, did not materialize in the same way.
Subsequent developments revealed that the Iraqi government had given armed factions until June 30, 2027 to place their weapons under state control — nine full months after the completion of the U.S. withdrawal.
This effectively dismantled the automatic linkage between the two processes that had underpinned the original understandings, replacing it with a more flexible formula that gives the armed factions additional time and reflects a policy of containing them rather than terminating their role.
Third: Iran’s Position on the Withdrawal and the Disarmament of Armed Factions
Iran’s position on the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq evolved into a strategic narrative that placed the Iraqi development within a broader regional project.
In an official statement, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps described the completed withdrawal as a “historic victory,” congratulating the Iraqi people, the Islamic resistance front in Iraq and revolutionary fighters throughout the Islamic world.
It also called on U.S. forces to leave the wider region and allow its peoples to manage their own security.
Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf likewise said that the resistance front had emerged victorious.
Such framing places the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq within Tehran’s broader confrontation with Washington over the future of the American presence in West Asia, rather than treating it solely as an Iraqi sovereign achievement.
This discourse reflects the continuation of an Iranian approach that separates the U.S. withdrawal — which Tehran can celebrate as a symbolic gain for the “Axis of Resistance” — from the question of disarming Iraqi factions, which Iran regards as an instrument of strategic deterrence that cannot easily be surrendered.
This is particularly significant during a period of war in which networks of armed factions in Iraq, Lebanon and Yemen have served as compensatory instruments in the balance of power between Tehran on one side and Washington and Tel Aviv on the other.
Fourth: The Armed Factions’ Position on the Withdrawal and Surrendering Weapons
Iraq’s armed factions responded to the completed withdrawal with rhetoric combining political celebration and security caution.
The Coordination Committee of the Iraqi Resistance described the withdrawal as a historic victory for Iraq’s Islamic resistance factions and a crushing defeat for the American project.
It argued that Iraqi sovereignty could not be protected by foreign forces, but rather by the resistance and the will of the Iraqi people.
The statement also contained a clear and notable implication that armed factions would seek to fill the resulting vacuum, reinforcing the prospect of their continued existence as an armed structure operating in parallel to the state.
This rhetoric is consistent with the equation separating the timetable for the U.S. withdrawal from the timetable for dealing with factional weapons, while the Popular Mobilization Forces continue to provide the institutional framework through which armed factions retain their weapons and organizational particularities in return for pledges not to undertake new military operations.
This approach was reflected in the government’s decision to extend the deadline until June 2027, transforming the state monopoly on arms from an obligation intended to coincide with the withdrawal into a prolonged negotiating process.
The extension gives the factions and their external sponsor additional time to reorganize their positions in light of developments in the regional war and the trajectory of U.S.-Iranian negotiations.
Fifth: The U.S. Position and the Continuing Logic of Gradual Deterrence
The final configuration Iran has established around Iraq’s armed factions does not appear to satisfy Washington, nor does it correspond with the Iraqi prime minister’s commitments to place all weapons under state authority.
Nevertheless, the available indicators do not suggest a sharp U.S. reaction to the extended timetable, largely because Washington appears to favor gradual deterrence over direct confrontation.
Plans to end the coalition mission are no longer practically reversible.
The available alternative is to push the Iraqi government toward signing a bilateral security agreement guaranteeing the presence of units tasked with protecting diplomatic activities and companies — a model that would reposition U.S. engagement from direct military deployment toward more distant security partnerships.
Washington is also relying on the continued effectiveness of targeted sanctions in weakening Iranian financing networks inside Iraq, while maintaining readiness for joint military operations with regional states whenever Iraqi armed factions launch new attacks against U.S. allies.
The U.S.-Saudi strike of July 29 is presented as one such example, potentially placing the Popular Mobilization Forces themselves under formal scrutiny.
Under this approach, time and compound economic pressure are expected to reshape Iraq’s domestic political map and weaken the influence networks Iran has built inside the country, making crisis management a temporarily acceptable alternative to immediately resolving the issue.
Sixth: Challenges Created by the Withdrawal and the Postponement of Disarmament
Masoud Barzani’s warning that the ISIS scenario could recur following the withdrawal of coalition forces carries practical significance, given that the organization remains present in areas of contact between Iraq’s federal government and the Kurdistan Region and could exploit existing security gaps.
In the same context, Kurdistan Regional Government Prime Minister Masrour Barzani described the timing of the U.S. withdrawal as “highly sensitive” and even “embarrassing,” arguing that security instability threatens the foundations of Iraq’s federal system.
He also expressed concern about leaving the Kurdistan Region without effective defensive systems, noting that the region had been subjected to more than a thousand missile and drone attacks during the recent war.
His comments pointed to the loss of the U.S. defensive umbrella that had helped absorb some of those threats.
This means that relations between Baghdad and Erbil could also become more complicated, potentially undermining political and security stability if the government fails to resolve the issue of factional weapons or neutralize armed factions in a manner that prevents the resurgence of ISIS.
These warnings reveal an additional dimension of Iraq’s security-vacuum dilemma.
The problem is not limited to the possibility that armed factions could exploit the absence of an American deterrent. It also includes the fragility of security arrangements between the federal government and the Kurdistan Region, as well as terrorist threats still capable of exploiting any weakening of security coordination or any diversion of state attention toward managing the armed-factions issue at the expense of other fronts.
The trajectory of Iraq’s internal situation also cannot be separated from the regional conditions created by the Israeli-American war against Iran that began in early 2026.
Iraq became unofficially drawn into the conflict, particularly as factions affiliated with the Islamic Resistance Coordination escalated their activities.
This resulted in an almost complete violation of Iraqi airspace and territorial waters by the various parties to the conflict, while the Kurdistan Region was subjected to hundreds of missile and drone attacks launched from Iran and by allied factions.
The analytical significance of this war lies in the fact that it did more than reshape military balances.
It also redefined regional security priorities.
The emerging regional order is moving toward several overlapping security frameworks rather than a single comprehensive alliance: a Gulf-Iranian framework for managing neighborhood relations and preventing escalation, alongside specific arrangements governing energy security and strategic corridors.
This approach reflects a shift from the logic of a balance of deterrence, which dominated the previous two decades, toward a balance of interests linking security stability to mutual economic interdependence.
This transformation poses a structural challenge for Iraq.
The more the emerging regional order moves toward non-aggression agreements between Gulf states and Iran, mutual respect for sovereignty, and the linkage of security to economic interests, the more incompatible independently armed organizations with autonomous authority over decisions of war and peace — such as Iraq’s armed factions — become with the logic of that new regional system.
Such groups may increasingly shift, from Iran’s perspective, from strategic assets into strategic liabilities that complicate Tehran’s emerging regional relationships.
This helps explain Iran’s reliance on allied factions as instruments of asymmetric deterrence compensating for the limitations of its conventional military capabilities in the face of U.S. and Israeli military superiority.
Iraq, meanwhile, remains one of the countries most exposed to any further internal instability in Iran or any renewed confrontation because of its geographic position, long border with Iran, and extensive sectarian, political and economic ties.
It therefore represents a central test of the state’s ability to protect its sovereignty in a regional environment whose security and economic rules are being rewritten.
Seventh: Scenarios After September 30
Scenario One: Partial and Gradual Implementation
The first scenario — and the one identified in the article as the most likely in light of the extension until June 2027 — involves the partial and gradual implementation of mechanisms designed to place weapons under state authority.
This would involve a flexible timetable negotiated with armed factions, leading to the suspension of their external military activity without eliminating the structural challenge they pose.
The arrangement would remain dependent on developments in the regional conflict and the future of U.S.-Iranian negotiations.
It would also include continued support for the Popular Mobilization Forces as the institutional framework protecting the armed factions, with the government potentially changing its methods if it proves unable to balance American and Iranian pressure.
Scenario Two: A Comprehensive State-Led Disarmament Approach
The second scenario would involve the al-Zaidi government capitalizing on the recognition by all sides of its right to represent state sovereignty over weapons.
Building on the completion of the U.S. withdrawal and on regional and public support, the government would launch a comprehensive approach aimed at dismantling the sources of armed factions’ power.
This would include restructuring the Popular Mobilization Forces, integrating individual fighters into security and civilian institutions, and severing their organizational ties to party and factional leaderships.
Most of the foundations of this scenario have formed the core of the al-Zaidi government’s rhetoric during recent months.
The decision to extend the deadline until mid-2027, however, suggests that this approach has receded in favor of the first scenario.
Scenario Three: U.S. Unilateral or Multilateral Intervention
The third scenario would involve unilateral or multilateral U.S. intervention to address threats posed by Iraqi armed factions through broader measures, whether through an international coalition or new United Nations Security Council resolutions.
This scenario remains dependent on the trajectory of the Iran-U.S. conflict and its wider regional consequences.
Current indicators, however, do not support the likelihood of a large-scale pre-emptive move of this kind.
Scenario Four: A Parallel Security Threat
The fourth scenario involves a parallel security threat.
In light of Masoud Barzani’s warnings, it is not possible to rule out a situation in which failure to place factional weapons under state control coincides with renewed ISIS activity in the contact zones between Baghdad and Erbil.
This could occur amid the security vacuum created by the disappearance of the U.S. defensive umbrella and the federal government’s preoccupation with managing internal political balances.
Iraq’s stability would then face a dual threat: an armed actor aligned with a regional state, represented by the armed factions, and a transnational insurgent actor represented by ISIS.
The indicators for this scenario place it after the first scenario in the article’s assessment.
Conclusion
In light of the regional transformations generated by the war, the process of disarming Iraq’s armed factions remains dependent on the course of U.S.-Iranian negotiations and on the ability of an Iraqi state burdened by economic crisis and fragile domestic balances to transform “Sovereignty Day” into an effective reality.
Ultimately, however, Iranian determinants, together with the absence of clear Iraqi implementation plans translated into comprehensive laws and large-scale procedures, will remain two principal obstacles to any tightly controlled process capable of securing the state’s monopoly on weapons and enforcing national sovereignty.
At the same time, terrorist threats associated with the security vacuum and the potential return of extremist organizations add another layer of complexity to a security equation that, after September 30, has become increasingly open to a wide range of possibilities and scenarios.
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