The Ukraine file has returned to the U.S.-Russian negotiating table at a moment whose implications extend far beyond the boundaries of a war that has lasted for more than four years. U.S. envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner arrived in Moscow carrying a new proposal from President Donald Trump’s administration and held talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin for more than three hours before traveling on to Kyiv. Although the meeting produced no announced agreement, both sides spoke of progress, new ideas and the possibility of another round of negotiations. At the same time, Putin ordered a temporary halt to strikes on Kyiv during the U.S. delegation’s visit, while Ukraine responded by expressing readiness to suspend strikes on Moscow over the same period.
The fundamental disputes that derailed previous negotiations have not disappeared. Moscow remains committed to demands concerning territories it has annexed or seeks to control, as well as Ukraine’s future membership in NATO, while Kyiv rejects surrendering territories still under its control and insists on security guarantees designed to prevent another war. The current round therefore cannot be treated as a completed U.S.-Russian agreement. Its significance, however, lies in the fact that contacts have regained momentum after months of stagnation and that Washington and Moscow have begun discussing issues extending beyond the military frontlines.
The most significant indication came from the Kremlin itself, when Russian presidential aide Yuri Ushakov said the talks were not limited to settling the Ukrainian crisis, but also covered economic issues and potentially major Russian-American projects that could benefit both sides. This dimension broadens the scope of the negotiations because any path toward restoring economic relations between the United States and Russia, or easing part of Moscow’s isolation, would force the Kremlin to reassess calculations that have shaped its policy since the war began in 2022.
During the years of confrontation with the West, sanctions and political isolation pushed Russia to expand its relations with powers that were themselves under U.S. pressure, with Iran becoming one of the most important among them. International relations, however, are not necessarily defined by permanent alliances as much as by shifting interests and available alternatives. The question concerning Iran therefore does not begin with the assumption that Washington and Moscow have reached an agreement to sacrifice Tehran, but rather with the possibility that Iran’s importance in Russian calculations could decline if Moscow gains an opportunity to rebuild part of its political and economic relationship with the United States.
That possibility comes at an exceptionally difficult moment for Iran. Confrontation between Tehran and Washington has returned to escalation after a period of relative calm. U.S. Central Command said its forces targeted three Iranian oil tankers after Iran launched ballistic missiles toward two U.S. Navy vessels, while Iranian officials warned that any new attacks would be met with faster and harsher responses. Alongside the military confrontation, Tehran is facing a broad blockade and mounting pressure on its oil exports, making the economic crisis a central component of its current confrontation with Washington.
Oil exports have become one of the main pressure points on the Iranian economy. Data cited by Reuters showed that Iranian crude loadings have fallen sharply compared with levels recorded before the blockade was tightened, while the country is also grappling with currency volatility, inflation, unemployment and difficulties managing domestic markets. Despite the political support Tehran has received from Russia, China and other members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, Reuters noted that no clear economic lifeline has emerged capable of offsetting the losses caused by U.S. pressure.
This is where the impact of any U.S.-Russian détente becomes important for Iran, even if Tehran is not directly involved in the negotiations over Ukraine. The continuation of the European war means that Russia remains locked in open confrontation with the United States and its allies, a situation that increases the importance of partners capable of helping Moscow or working with it to circumvent Western pressure. Ending or freezing the war, however, while opening the door to U.S.-Russian economic projects, could prompt Moscow to reassess the level of risk it is willing to assume on behalf of other partners, particularly when relations with those partners could bring it into direct confrontation with Washington.
This does not necessarily mean that Russia would turn against Iran. The two countries have interests extending well beyond the war in Ukraine, and Moscow has no obvious interest in transforming Tehran into an adversary or abandoning political influence it has built in the Middle East over many years. If its relationship with the United States improves, Russia could seek to preserve its ties with Iran while simultaneously expanding cooperation with Washington, taking advantage of its ability to communicate with both sides. Its relationship with Tehran could even become a source of additional leverage for Moscow in any negotiations concerning Gulf security, the nuclear program or the future of the Iranian-American confrontation.
The problem for Tehran is not necessarily that it could become an item in a written deal, but that the balance of dependency within the Russian-Iranian relationship could change. When Moscow faced near-total isolation from the West, its network of ties with Iran, China and other countries formed part of its ability to withstand that isolation. If Russia gains new economic and political channels with the United States, however, it may find itself with a wider range of alternatives at the very moment Iran enters the same period with fewer options under the pressure of war, oil restrictions and sanctions.
Another equally important factor concerns the United States’ ability to distribute its political and military resources between Europe and the Middle East. U.S.-Russian negotiations over Ukraine had previously stalled to a significant degree after Washington shifted its priority toward the war with Iran, according to Reuters and Time. A settlement, or even a stable freeze in the Ukrainian conflict, could therefore allow Washington to redirect a greater share of its military and diplomatic attention toward Iran.
Energy adds another dimension to this equation. The conflict with Iran has once again brought supply risks and the Strait of Hormuz to the forefront of oil markets, pushing prices higher with each new round of escalation. At the same time, the crisis has shown that oil traffic through the Gulf has not stopped completely. Iraq managed to increase its exports in August after some of its tankers received Iranian permission to pass through the strait, indicating that Tehran still possesses an important geographical lever, although one it cannot use without incurring significant economic and political costs.
If the current negotiations develop into a broader settlement, Iran’s potential loss would not necessarily result from an explicit U.S.-Russian agreement directed against Tehran, but rather from a change in the international environment surrounding it. A Russia that needs Iran while isolated from the West would not necessarily be the same Russia presented with investments, projects and economic understandings with the United States. Likewise, a United States preoccupied with two wars in Europe and the Middle East would not be in the same position if it succeeded in closing one front or substantially reducing its cost.
At the same time, this scenario remains dependent on the success of negotiations that have so far advanced no further than preliminary ideas. Russia and Ukraine remain divided over territory, security guarantees and the future of Kyiv’s relationship with NATO. Witkoff and Kushner have not provided details of the new ideas they heard in Moscow, while Washington has not disclosed the form of the proposal Trump referred to. Talk of a deal involving Iran therefore goes beyond what the available facts currently establish. It is more accurate, however, to speak of a possible redistribution of interests if a Ukrainian settlement succeeds.
For Iran, the risk lies in the possibility that peace in Europe could arrive at a moment when Tehran needs its partners more than they need it. Iran faces pressure on its oil exports, currency and economy and is attempting to retain the Strait of Hormuz and its military capabilities as leverage to prevent Washington from imposing its terms. Moscow, meanwhile, could find itself presented with an opportunity to reopen political and economic channels whose closure was one of the factors that drove its increasingly close relationship with Iran in recent years.
There is so far no evidence that Iran will become the price of an agreement between Trump and Putin, nor are there publicly announced indications that Moscow has agreed to reduce its relationship with Tehran in exchange for a settlement of the Ukraine war. But if such an agreement evolves from an initiative to halt the fighting into a broader reconciliation between Russia and the United States, Iran could move from being a partner Moscow needs under sanctions to one whose support Russia weighs against the potential gains of opening up to Washington. At that point, the issue would not be that Russia had abandoned Iran, but that the balance of relations that gave Tehran additional strategic value during the Ukraine war might no longer remain the same once the conflict ends.
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