Democracy is not measured by the number of governments formed, but by how much they change people’s lives and the nature of the authority governing them over the long term
Mithaq Manahi Al-Issa
Iraq has held numerous legislative election cycles. Regardless of the nature of these elections, the electoral system in place, or the criteria governing each electoral cycle, elections are, at the very least, expected to serve as an instrument of long-term change. Today, nearly a quarter of a century after the political transformation of 2003, governments continue to change with each electoral and legislative cycle, yet Iraq’s underlying problems remain unresolved. Governments are formed and replaced, political alliances are reconstructed, and new faces emerge at the forefront of political life before eventually departing. The more pressing question, however, is why this recurring change does not produce a corresponding transformation in the nature of governance, institutional performance, or the relationship between the state and its citizens. Why does the political landscape appear capable of absorbing successive crises without consistently overcoming the underlying causes that produced them? This is one of the central paradoxes of Iraq’s democratic experience: change, which is supposed to provide a means of rebuilding authority and correcting its course, can sometimes become a process of rearranging the same forces and redistributing roles and positions within the political system. The form of authority changes, while the rules governing its exercise remain in place.
Formally, Iraq possesses all the institutional components of democracy, including constitutional institutions, elections, and a multiparty system. These are important elements of any democratic system, but their existence alone is insufficient to determine the nature of democratic transformation. The issue concerns not only the mechanisms through which power is acquired, but also how and in what manner it is exercised, the extent to which it is subject to accountability, oversight, and transparency, and its capacity to produce public policies that respond to society’s needs. Democracy is not tested on election day alone; it is tested throughout the period between the election of one government and the next, whether in the ability of institutions to enforce the rule of law, ensure a fair distribution of opportunities, and safeguard the independence of administrative and political decision-making, or in the extent to which citizens feel that their electoral votes can make a tangible difference in their daily lives.
Power-Sharing and the Reproduction of Influence
Although Iraq’s political system and the structure of the state are clearly described in the country’s constitution, which came into force in 2005, understanding how the Iraqi political system operates in practice remains difficult without examining the mechanisms through which political forces reach consensus.
Consensus may be necessary in diverse societies, particularly when its purpose is to prevent exclusion and guarantee participation, as is the case in some European countries. The problem begins, however, when consensus shifts from being a means of managing differences to becoming a permanent mechanism for distributing positions and influence, and when settlements among political forces take precedence over standards of competence and the public interest. Under such circumstances, government formation becomes more than the selection of a team capable of implementing a political programme; it also becomes a complex negotiation over positions, quotas, and balances of power.
This inevitably weakens political accountability and obscures the defining features of the political system, because citizens find it difficult to determine which party should bear responsibility for failure, particularly when multiple actors share power without the presence of a genuine opposition, only to exchange accusations when crises emerge.
This does not necessarily mean that all political forces are alike, or that every political consensus constitutes an obstacle to reform and success. The problem, rather, lies in the absence of safeguards ensuring that consensus serves the public interest instead of becoming merely a means of protecting and reproducing influence. This may well be the most prominent challenge facing Iraq’s political system since 2003.
When Interests Take Precedence over Programmes
A functioning democracy requires competition among clearly defined political, economic, and social programmes, enabling voters to compare alternatives, make choices, and hold elected representatives accountable. When competition over policy programmes gives way to calculations centred on forming alliances and dividing positions, elections may lose their capacity to deliver the transformation society expects.
This is the same problem that has afflicted Iraqi democracy for more than two decades. Citizens do not vote merely to see the names of officeholders change; they expect better employment opportunities, more efficient public services, institutions less vulnerable to political interference, and a state that treats its citizens on the basis of rights and obligations rather than their proximity to one political faction or another. Citizens also expect a state that commands significance and authority at both the domestic and regional levels, rather than one that lacks sovereignty over its internal and external affairs, including its land and airspace.
When the gap between electoral promises and actual outcomes recurs with every electoral cycle, confidence in the political process declines, and the perception that electoral change fails to bring about genuine transformation becomes increasingly entrenched. At that point, the problem is no longer merely an electoral one; it becomes a compound crisis in the relationship between citizens and the political system, as well as in the nature of that system and the way the state is governed. The continuation of this crisis pushes segments of society towards disengagement from political participation or towards seeking alternatives outside institutional channels.
Does the Crisis Lie in Individuals or in the Rules?
In Iraq, responsibility cannot be attributed solely to individuals while ignoring the rules, nor can the rules be blamed without considering the people operating within them. Focusing exclusively on individuals may explain certain aspects of political failure, but it does not adequately account for the persistence of particular patterns of political conduct. Even when leaders change, the same rules of operation can reproduce the same behaviour, as long as political incentives do not encourage the development of independent institutions and the consequences of failure do not clearly affect the prospects of remaining in power. This is compounded by the numerous gaps in constitutional and legal provisions and frameworks, whether executive, legislative, or oversight-related.
In this context, genuine reform does not begin simply by replacing one official with another or forming a new government with different promises. It requires reconsidering the rules governing the exercise of power and defining the relationship between political forces and state institutions. This includes strengthening the independence of oversight and judicial institutions within their constitutionally defined jurisdictions, consolidating the principle of equal opportunity, linking responsibility to accountability, and developing political parties so that they compete on the basis of programmes and achievements rather than their ability to retain positions of influence and economic offices.
It also requires an effective political opposition capable of scrutinising government performance and presenting realistic alternatives, rather than allowing political competition to become a matter of waiting for the next turn to manage state power. Democracy cannot function properly through a strong government alone. It also requires independent oversight institutions, a responsible opposition, and a society capable of demanding its rights and holding its representatives accountable. Legislative authority and its work must not be reduced to the control exercised by the leaders of political blocs and forces.
Overall, Iraq’s challenge appears to lie not in the continued rotation of officeholders, but in transforming the transfer of power into a means of changing the very rules of governance. The true measure of any government’s success is not its ability to complete its term or preserve the balance of forces that brought it to power, but its capacity to strengthen state institutions, improve citizens’ lives, and subject public decision-making to accountability. Democracy is not measured by the number of governments formed, but by the extent to which they can change people’s lives and the nature of the authority governing them over the long term.
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